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In capital cases, the trial process is commonly separated into a
guilt phase and a sentencing phase. In the guilt phase, capital trial ju-
rors determine whether the defendant is guilty of a crime for which
death may be an appropriate penalty. If guilt is determined during this
initial phase, the trial moves to a sentencing phase where the same jury
must then decide whether to impose the death penalty or life
imprisonment.
Because of the risk that adamant opponents of the death penalty
could not fully consider the range of punishments allowed by law in the
sentencing phase, and because their opposition to capital punishment
could nullify meaningful deliberations during the guilt phase, prospec-
tive jurors who express an inability to consider the death penalty if the
defendant were found guilty are excluded from jury service for cause.
The resulting "death-qualified" jury has been declared unconstitutional
by the Eighth Circuit.1 The Eighth Circuit decision creates an inter-
circuit conflict 2 to be resolved by the United States Supreme Court in
* B.A., M.A., and Ph.D., University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, Associate Professor of Psy-
chology and Criminal Justice, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
1. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, sub nom McCree v. Lockhart,
546 U.S. 1088 (1985) (No. 84-1865, 1986 Term).
The plenary hearing consolidated the Grigsby case with two other habeas corpus petitions, by
DeWayne Hulsey and Ardia McCree, which also raised Witherspoon arguments. See Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).Only Grigsby and McCree were successful as Hulsey did
not object to the exclusion of Witherspoon-excludables at the time of his trial and his case was
held to be procedurally barred under the rule of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The
trial court opinion was published as Grigsby v. Mabry, because Mabry was Commissioner of the
Arkansas Department of Correction when Grigsby filed his petition. When McCree filed his peti-
tion, Vernon Housewright was Commissioner and the Eighth Circuit opinion was published as
Grigsby v. Mabry and Housewright v. McCree. By the time of the appeal to the Supreme Court,
Grigsby had been murdered in his cell (June, 1983) and Lockhart was the Commissioner of Cor-
rections. The style of the Supreme Court case now is McCree v. Lockhart.
2. The Fifth Circuit upheld death-qualified juries in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979), with further discussion in Smith v. Balkcom,
660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), affd on rehearing 671 F.2d 858, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
The Fourth Circuit upheld death-qualified juries in Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.
1984), rev'g 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984).
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1986. The purpose of the present article is not to anticipate the Court's
decision but to assess the effect of several structural trial arrangements
on critical issues associated with death-qualification.
II. BACKGROUND
Since 1968, significant constitutional questions have been raised
concerning the "death-qualified" jury which results from the screening
process. The year 1968 marks the date of Witherspoon v. Illinois,3 a
landmark case relative to the death-qualification issue. Prior to Wither-
spoon, prospective jurors were excluded from capital cases on the basis
of any expressed opposition to the death penalty. However, Wither-
spoon argued that the removal of forty-seven prospective jurors from
his trial because of their reservations concerning the death penalty re-
sulted in a jury predisposed to convict him at the guilt phase and to
deliver a death sentence at the penalty phase of his trial. In regard to
bias at the penalty phase, the Court agreed and concluded that it was
"self-evident" 4 that the exclusion of prospective jurors simply on the
basis of "general objections to the death penalty"' unfairly favored a
death sentence and violated due process requirements under the four-
teenth amendment.' As a consequence, Witherspoon's death sentence
was overturned and the Court altered the definitional attributes of a
death-qualified jury. In particular, exclusion on the broad basis of gen-
eral opposition to the death penalty was narrowed as the Court ruled
that the only prospective jurors who could constitutionally be elimi-
nated because of their opposition to capital punishment were:
[T]hose who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would auto-
matically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without
regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case
before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's
guilt.
7
The Court also considered whether the same exclusions resulted in
a "tribunal organized to convict" 8 at the guilt phase of a trial. Unlike
the self-evident rationale which governed the penalty-phase decision,
empirical research was consulted to determine whether a guilt phase
3. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
4. Id. at 518.
5. Id. at 522.
6. Id. at 523.
7. Id. at 522-23 n.21.
8. Id. at 521 (quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294 (1947)).
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bias resulted from death-qualification. Three unpublished studies were
reviewed which suggested that death-qualified jurors were more likely
to convict than were jurors excludable because of their opposition to
the death penalty.9 The studies were judged as "too tentative and frag-
mentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend
to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt"' 0 or that the
"exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment increases the risk of
conviction."'" The Court went on to invite further research on the issue
when it noted that:
Even so, a defendant convicted by [a death-qualified] jury in
some future case might still attempt to establish that the jury was less
than neutral with respect to guilt. If he were to succeed in that effort,
the question would then arise whether the State's interest in submit-
ting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punish-
ment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's interest in a
completely fair determination of guilt or innocence - given the possi-
bility of accommodating both interests by means of a bifurcated trial,
using one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment. That
problem is not presented here, however, and we intimate no view as to
its proper resolution.' 2
In short, the Court defined the issue as an empirical question, sus-
ceptible to scientific resolution, but withheld judgment in ruling that a
constitutional decision would require an empirical record more com-
plete than the limited evidence available at the time.
After 1968, as new studies became available demonstrating a reli-
able relationship between death-penalty attitude and conviction behav-
9. The studies were:
(a) W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (unpublished
manuscript, University of Texas, 1964).
(b) F. Goldberg, Attitude toward Capital Punishment and Behavior as a Juror in
Simulated Cases (unpublished manuscript, Morehouse College, undated), sub-
sequently published as Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital
Scruples, Jury Bias, and the Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presump-
tions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53 (1970).
(c) H. Zeisel, Some Insights into the Operation of Criminal Juries (unpublished
manuscript, University of Chicago, 1957), subsequently published as CENTER
FOR STUDIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL,
SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1968).
10. 391 U.S. at 517-18.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 520 n.18 (emphasis in original). In the Witherspoon dissent, Justice White also
added that he "would not wholly foreclose the possibility of a showing that certain restrictions on
jury membership imposed because of jury participation in penalty determination produce a jury
which is not constitutionally constituted for the purpose of determining guilt." Id. at 541 n.l.
1985-86]
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ior, several cases were heard in which the defense sought to establish
that the evidence was no longer "tentative and fragmentary.""3 The
clear pattern of interpretation by the courts was that the new results
were still not definitive as not enough new evidence had been added
since the issue was last considered. Two exceptions to this pattern were
Hovey v. Superior Court14 in California and an Arkansas case, Grigsby
v. Mabry.1
5
A central issue in both Hovey and Grigsby concerned the impact
of the death-qualified screening process on jury composition, and subse-
quent jury performance at the guilt phase of a trial. Consider two pro-
spective jurors, neither of whom would consider the death penalty. Both
jurors are excludable under the Witherspoon standard and may be de-
scribed as Witherspoon-excludable (WE). The exclusion of both jurors
from the sentencing phase of a trial is consistent with the state's legiti-
mate interest that all legally relevant penalties be considered. But their
disposition toward sentence also removes both jurors from the guilt
phase of a trial where their performance may clearly be distinguisha-
ble. The critical distinction between the two jurors turns on their re-
sponse to whether or not they could make a fair and impartial determi-
nation of guilt given their common opposition to the death penalty.
Suppose one says that he or she could not. Clearly, then, that individ-
ual is a "nullifier" and is legitimately excluded from both phases of the
trial. Further suppose, however, that one says yes, that despite his or
her death-penalty views, he or she could make a fair and impartial de-
termination of guilt. This second juror is therefore not a nullifier but is
nonetheless indiscriminately excluded from capital jury service under
the prevailing Witherspoon standard.1" Some kind of distinction is re-
quired between the two types of prospective jurors. Since both are ex-
cludable under Witherspoon, the WE label clearly applies to both sub-
jects. However, since one would nullify meaningful guilt deliberations
whereas the other could be fair and impartial, the nullifier will be re-
13. Comment, Grigsby v. Mabry: A New Look at Death-Qualified Juries, 18 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 145, 145-63 (1980). The author cites twenty-two unsuccessful cases. Id. at 161-62 n.154.
The author also suggests that the incremental consideration of the new studies, rather than the
cumulative evidence, contributed to the repetitive "tentative and fragmentary" findings. Id. at 162
n.155.
14. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
15. 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark. 1980), modified, reh'g granted, 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir.
1980).
16. As will be seen, the contemporary justification for exclusion of the second juror is based
on his or her inability to consider the full range of penalties allowed by law.
[Vol. 8:479
DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES
ferred to as "WEnu" and the impartial juror as "WEfair.' 1 7
Now suppose that studies were conducted which compared the
jury composition, and jury performance, of traditional death-qualified
juries (which eliminated all classes of WE's) with juries that eliminated
WEnull, but included WEfair jurors. If the comparison revealed that
death-qualified juries significantly distorted jury composition (e.g., by
the disproportionate elimination of distinctive groups or distinctive
community viewpoints), or were more likely to convict a defendant
than juries that included WEfair jurors, then a case could be made that
the results of death qualification were unfair to the defendant and that
WEfair jurors should be included at the guilt phase of a trial.
In both Hovey and Grigsby, extensive evidentiary records were in-
troduced which demonstrated that the exclusion of WEfair jurors
through death-qualification had a marked effect, to a defendant's dis-
advantage, both on jury composition and jury performance. By virtue
of their correlation with death-penalty attitude, both blacks and fe-
males are disproportionately excluded from capital jury service as are
individuals who tend to be more critical of testimony, exhibit better
retention of evidence, and are generally associated with additional
characteristics related to jury deliberations and jury decisions.18 That
is, the composition of a death-qualified jury significantly differs from
the composition of a jury when it includes WEfair jurors. The eviden-
tiary record also impressively demonstrated that death-qualified juries
are significantly more likely to convict a defendant when WEfair jurors
are excluded. 9
In Hovey, the California Supreme Court found the evidence per-
suasive that death-qualified juries allowable under Witherspoon are bi-
ased against the defendant at the guilt phase of a trial. However,
death-qualification in California provides for the exclusion not only of
WE's who would never vote for the death penalty, but also of prospec-
tive jurors who would always vote for the death penalty (Always death
penalty or "ADP"). Conceivably, the exclusion of ADP's counterbal-
anced the exclusion of WE's if the relative frequencies in the excluded
groups were approximately equivalent. Since the frequencies could not
be estimated with any precision, the California Supreme Court con-
17. The terms WEnull and WE air are novel adoptions. The usual terms are nullifier and GPI
(Guilt Phase Includable), used in both Grigsby and McCree.
18. In addition to the trial records, many of the research results are now available in an
elaborated form, published in a special issue devoted to death-qualification. See generally 8 LAW
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1-195 (Haney ed. 1984).




cluded that death-qualification, as practiced in California, was not
clearly unconstitutional.2 0 The introduction of the ADP issue injected a
new dimension into constitutional challenges to death-qualification.
Now, relevant studies would be required to demonstrate that the com-
position and performance of death-qualified juries were significantly
different from juries that included both WEfair jurors and ADP jurors.
At approximately the same time as the Hovey case, the Grigsby
case was heard in Arkansas, where a more limited evidentiary record
was available and where, like California, ADP's were ostensibly ex-
cluded from capital trial proceedings." Nevertheless, the trial court in
Grigsby found the limited record suggestive and recommended a full
evidentiary hearing on the issue at the circuit level. Then, upon remand
from the Eighth Circuit, 2 the district court held a plenary hearing to
consider the cumulative evidence relating to whether a defendant's con-
stitutional guarantees were violated by the systematic exclusion of ju-
rors excludable under the Witherspoon standard. Essentially the same
evidence available to Hovey was introduced in Grigsby. In addition,
post-Hovey studies which provided for reasonable estimates of the nu-
merical size of both the WE and the ADP groups were available.2 3
These latter studies indicated that the ADP group constituted less than
one percent of the eligible juror population while the WE group was
between ten and fifteen percent. The primary significance of the nu-
merical difference was to indicate that the exclusion of ADP's was not
an effective counterbalance to the exclusion of WE's. This showing re-
moved the Hovey barrier, which prevented a finding of guilt phase bias
20. 28 Cal. 3d at 45, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
21. The voir dire discovery and exclusion of ADP's is difficult. Consider the following ex-
change from Grigsby:
Q. Do you have any conscientious scruples or fixed opinion about the use of the
death penalty?
A. No, sir.
MR. WILLIAMS: That's all.
BY MR. GRAVES:
Q. Do you have any scruples about using the death penalty in favor of anybody?
MR. WILLIAMS: I object to whatever that question was.
MR. GRAVES: Your Honor, my question was the reverse of his. He asked if he
had any conscientious scruples against using the death penalty, and I asked if he had
any conscientious scruples in favor of using the death penalty. I thought it was a fair
question.
THE COURT: Well, the Court thinks it is not.
Supplemental Abstract and Brief for Appellee at 7, Grigsby v. State, 260 Ark. 499, 542
S.W.2d 275 (1976).
22. Grigsby v. Mabry, 637 F.2d 525, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1980).
23. See BERRY, supra note 19, at 26-30.
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in death-qualified juries that were modified by the exclusion of ADP's.
In an incisive analysis of the empirical evidence and the legal issues,
the trial court concluded that death-qualification suffered "from two
serious constitutional defects: first, it denies the accused a trial by a
jury representative of a cross-section of the community; and second, it
creates juries that are conviction-prone." '24
As a consequence, prospective jurors in capital cases could not be
"barred over the defendant's objection from jury service because of
their views on capital punishment on any broader basis than inability to
follow the law or to abide by their oaths ... .
On the one hand, judicial recognition of the composition and per-
formance bias which results from death-qualification creates a climate
of consistency between the legal system and the scientific community.
In addition, however, it creates a dilemma for the single-jury system
traditionally used to try capital cases. The essence of the dilemma is
that death-qualification results in the removal of WEfair jurors which,
in turn, results in a non-representative, conviction-prone jury at the
guilt phase of a trial. One obvious remedy would be to include WEfair
subjects in capital cases. However, in the event of a guilty verdict, the
WEfair juror could not participate in the sentencing phase as he or she
would not consider all penalties. The dilemma is the problem of accom-
modating the apparently conflicting fair trial interests of both the de-
fendant and the state, i.e., accommodating the defendant's interest in
including WEfair jurors at the guilt phase with the state's interest in
excluding the same jurors from the sentencing phase. The dilemma is
acute for a single jury that decides both guilt and sentence because one
category of juror, the WEfair, cannot participate in both phases.
In contending with the conflict, Judge Eisele noted that the "pre-
sumption of inclusion"2 6 was basic to the concept of a jury in a demo-
cratic society and that "[i]nclusion, not exclusion, must be the basic
rule."'27 Further, the criterion of inclusion was whether prospective ju-
rors could "honestly swear that they can, and will, try the case upon
the basis of the law and the evidence."' 28 Since WEfair jurors met the
inclusion criterion at the guilt phase, but not at the penalty phase, the
trial court's remedy was to order that the state of Arkansas must hold
bifurcated jury trials in capital cases with one jury deciding the ques-
24. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
25. Id. at 1323.
26. Id. at 1311 (emphasis in original).




tion of guilt or innocence and, if necessary, a second, separate jury to
decide the question of punishment." The separate jury remedy was
seen by the trial court as the "least intrusive" 0 means to achieve a
balance between several state interests and the defendant's interest in a
fair and impartial trial.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that
death-qualified juries were unconstitutional but vacated the require-
ment directing the state to utilize two separate juries. The actual proce-
dural remedy was left to the discretion of the state.31
The Eighth Circuit decision created an inter-circuit conflict" and
the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the issue.3
No prediction is made here concerning the Court's ultimate decision
and the analysis which follows is independent of that decision. What
can be predicted is that any decision the Court makes will have signifi-
cant implications for the structure of a capital-case trial: whether the
guilt phase and sentencing phase are to be heard by a single jury or
some variant of independent juries.
III. THE REMEDIES
The prevailing capital-trial structure in Arkansas is the single-jury
system in which the same jury decides both guilt or innocence and, if
necessary, the penalty. The most apparent independent jury alterna-
tives would have guilt or innocence decided by one jury while any nec-
essary penalty would be decided by (1) a traditional death-qualified
jury that is separate from the guilt phase jury, (2) the same jury that
decided guilt, with necessary replacements for WEfair jurors, or (3) the
judge. A further description of the three independent remedies is pro-
vided below.
A. Separate Juries
In its most basic form, the separate jury solution would require the
formation of a guilt phase jury under rules which assured the exclusion
of nullifiers and the non-causative exclusion of WEfair jurors.3' If the
defendant were found guilty, the guilt phase jury would be dismissed
29. Id. at 1313.
30. Id.
31. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, sub nom McCree v. Lock-
hart, 546 U.S. 1088 (1985) (No. 84-1865, 1986 Term).
32. See supra note 2.
33. 546 U.S. 1088.
34. The WEfair juror could still be excluded by peremptory challenge.
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and a second jury formed. The second jury would experience death-
qualification voir dire to identify, and eliminate, prospective jurors who
could not consider the full range of penalties.
The most obvious problem with separate juries involves considera-
tions of possible cost. In Grigsby, however, it was not clear whether
separate juries would increase, or decrease, the cost of trial process-
ing.38 What was clear, was that a potential increase in expense did not
justify the denial of a fair trial.80 In our democratic system, what is the
price of a trial before fair and impartial jurors?
Another objection to separate juries was outlined by the Arkansas
Supreme Court when, in the Rector v. State87 response to Grigsby, it
described the separate jury remedy as the "least appealing"38 of the
known possibilities. The Arkansas court's objection was that the pen-
alty trial "would be comparable to having the actors in a play, after the
audience had left the theater, repeat their lines in a second perform-
ance for a few spectators in a nearly empty house. Such repetitive trials
could not be consistently fair to the State and perhaps not even to the
accused. ' 's
In Rector, the court did not elaborate as to why "repetitive trials"
could not be fair and one can only speculate concerning the rationale
for its objection. Presumably, a primary factor would be the necessity
to recall witnesses and to rehear testimony. While this necessity might
influence cost, it is not at all clear how it would affect fairness.
B. Replacement Juries
A variation of the separate jury is the replacement jury. These two
arrangements are identical with respect to jury formation at the guilt
phase but differ at the sentencing phase. In the separate jury remedy,
the guilt phase jury is "fair-qualified" and then dismissed even after a
guilty verdict. In the replacement remedy, a guilty verdict would be
followed by death-qualification of the same fair-qualified jurors who
determined guilt. The guilt phase jurors who could consider the full
range of penalties would be retained. Thus, while the separate jury
remedy forms a completely new jury at the sentencing phase, the re-
35. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1319-21 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
36. Id.
37. 280 Ark. 385, 395, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983).
38. Id. at 396, 659 S.W.2d at 173.
39. Id. The analogy to a play is questionable. Repetitive performance is a characteristic of
the most successful plays. And if not fair to the accused, one must wonder why the defense has
not embraced this position.
1985-86]
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placement remedy simply replaces the number of WEfair jurors re-
moved after the death-qualifying voir dire with the necessary number
of replacements.
One obvious advantage of the replacement remedy is that it would
be more efficient and more economical to replace a few jurors than to
replace twelve. Further, the necessity to recall witnesses or rehear testi-
mony could be avoided if a sufficient number of alternate jurors were
seated at the guilt phase to satisfy the required number of replacements
at the penalty phase, should sentencing become necessary.
A practical question concerning the necessary number of replace-
ments is revealed in the following interchange during oral argument
before the Supreme Court:
Justice White: I suppose if you had a rule that you cannot throw off
Witherspoon excludables, you cannot exclude them
from the guilt or innocence phase you would just -
you would find out if they were opposed to the death
penalty, but then seat them. And then you could,
when you had filled up the - got your twelve jurors,
you would add some alternates.
Mr. Clark: Your Honor, I think that procedure perhaps could
be advanced.
Justice White: I guess we just wouldn't know how many alternates
you would have had to have on that basis in this
case.
Mr. Clark: We would not have known, Your Honor, that's
correct.
Justice White: We don't know now.
Mr. Clark: No, that's right.
40
While neither Justice White nor Mr. Clark could be expected to
have known, their question concerning the necessary number of alter-
nates can be addressed. In Arkansas, for example, an examination of
forty-six capital murder cases involving 2,142 jurors revealed that 284
had been excluded by the Witherspoon criterion. 4' An additional eleven
were excluded as ADP's, making a total of 295 prospective jurors
(13.77%) excluded due to their death penalty view. Presumably, how-
ever, some of those excluded were nullifiers. Since there is agreement
that nullifiers would continue to be excluded from capital cases, there
are no nullifiers from the guilt phase to replace at the sentencing phase.
40. Lockhart v. McCree, Official Transcript proceedings, U.S. Supreme Court, Jan 13, 1986,
54-55 (No. 84-1865).
41. Young, A., Arkansas Archival Study, 1981 (unpublished).
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Accordingly, fourteen percent would seem to provide a liberal estimate
of the population frequency of WEfair (and ADPfair) jurors for whom
replacements would be necessary. While ten percent probably provides
a better estimate, the more realistic approach is to assume that the
frequency is represented within a range of five to fifteen percent. Given
this assumption, Table One specifies the probability that a given num-
ber of alternates would be required for replacement purposes. "'
Table 1
Probability that x or more jurors would be required




1 or more .4596 .7176 .8568
2 or more .1183 .3410 .5566
3 or more .0195 .1109 .2642
4 or more .0022 .0257 .0852
5 or more .0001 .0044 .0164
Table One can be interpreted in the following manner: If the pop-
ulation frequency of replacement jurors is equivalent to a given propor-
tion, say .10, then a guilt phase jury of size twelve could be expected to
require four or more replacements at the sentencing phase in fewer
than 3 out of every 100 capital cases (from .0257). In more than one-
fourth of the cases (1 - .7176 = .2824), no necessary replacement
would be expected.
Actually, the probabilities appearing in Table One overestimate
the number of alternates who would have to be added for potential
replacement purposes. This is because most capital case juries already
include alternates. If the original guilt phase jury included two alter-
nates, then the sentencing phase would require the seating of twelve
jurors from a pool of fourteen. When n = 14, the probability that
twelve eligible jurors would be unavailable would occur when there
were three or more to be excluded. The likelihood of this event is .1584,
or, put another way, in approximately 16 out of 100 capital cases, more
than two alternates would be required. By the simple addition of one
42. The entries in Table One were derived from the individual terms of the binomial distribu-




more alternate, the unlikely probability of not having twelve eligible
jurors from a pool of fifteen is reduced to .0555. With two more (n =
16), the probability is only .0170.
These results may be summarized by the statement that only
rarely would more than three alternates be required. The results
demonstrate that total replacement, equivalent to the separate jury
remedy, would virtually never be necessary. It would be an improve-
ment, of course, if the exact number of needed alternates could be
known before any penalty phase replacement became necessary. This
possibility will be considered in the context of the "sentencing phase"
problem.43
C. Judge
The final variant of the independent jury remedy would form the
guilt phase jury in a manner identical to the other arrangements. Then,
should a guilty verdict be obtained, subsequent argument concerning
sentencing would be before the judge who would decide the penalty
issue.
To the extent that the judge would not require death-qualification,
the use of the judge as the equivalent of the sentencing phase jury
would eliminate the necessity to recall witnesses or rehear testimony. It
would also eliminate the necessity for any extensive voir dire to assure
that all penalties could be considered. These potential advantages need
to be weighed against reported discrepancies between the behavior of
judges and juries. For example, Kalven and Zeisel" sent questionnaires
to judges throughout the country and asked them to briefly describe
criminal trials over which they had presided. The judges were also
asked to describe the jury decision and how they would have disposed
of the case had there been no jury. Any observed difference provides
one measure of how often the jury disagrees with the judge and the
direction of disagreement. Out of the 3,567 cases reviewed, the judge
agreed with the jury verdict in slightly more than seventy-five percent
of the cases. The agreement included the belief that thirteen percent of
the defendants should be acquitted and sixty-two percent should be
convicted. Judges disagreed with juries in about twenty-five percent of
the cases. The disagreement was generally due to cases where the jury
acquitted but the judge would have convicted. In fact, judges agreed
with jurors in fewer than half of the acquittals. These results suggest
43. See infra text accompanying note 59.
44. KALVEN and ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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that juries tend to be more lenient than judges with respect to the de-
termination of guilt. The present concern, however, is with sentencing,
not guilt, and the Kalven and Zeisel results provide no guidelines here.
The most relevant information would concern sentencing differences
between judges and juries in cases involving the death penalty. The
available data, limited to Florida, suggests that judges are somewhat
more likely to favor the death penalty than are juries.45
Now that the basic trial arrangements have been outlined, the fol-
lowing analysis examines the ability of the single jury system and the
independent jury systems to address several fundamental issues associ-
ated with death-qualification. Four basic problems can be identified for
analysis. One issue deals with balancing the defendant's interest in a
guilt phase hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal with the state's
interest in the removal of "nullifiers." This issue can be described as
the "guilt phase problem." A second issue can be described as the
"process" problem as it relates to consequences associated with the
very process of death-qualification. A third issue is the "sentencing
phase problem." This is concerned with assuring that the determination
of penalty be achieved in a context which provides for the full consider-
ation of all legally prescribed penalties. A final issue is whether differ-
ences between the various trial arrangements compel a preference for
one trial structure over another. This issue defines the "structure
problem."
IV. THE GUILT PHASE PROBLEM
When measured against non-capital criminal cases, death-qualifi-
cation is anomolous in that capital cases are the only cases in which the
prospective juror's views on sentencing are explored, and penalty en-
dorsements secured, as a necessary prelude to jury service."0 Viewed
historically, however, a compelling but dated objective of death-qualifi-
cation has been to remove from the determination of guilt those pro-
spective jurors who so objected to the death penalty that they would
automatically vote for acquittal (the nullifiers).4 7 The exclusion of nul-
45. Lockhart v. McCree, Official Transcript proceedings, U.S. Supreme Court, Jan. 13,
1986, 32-33 (No. 84-1865).
46. Arkansas contests this description. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
47. Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Con-
stitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEx. L. REv. 545 (1961). Oberer traced the
origin of the death-qualification practice to a time when conviction of a capital offense was auto-
matically followed by the death penalty. Under these conditions the exclusion of death penalty
opponents (which would include both WE fair and WEnull jurors) was considered essential. As sen-
tencing variations were developed which functionally separated the trial process into the bifur-
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lifiers continues to be regarded as a legitimate state interest in a fair
and impartial trial and was acknowledged, not challenged by the
Grigsby plaintiffs.4 8 The real Grigsby challenge was that the mecha-
nism which insures the removal of nullifiers also removes a distinctive
class of WEfair jurors and results in a jury biased in favor of conviction.
The Grigsby decision prohibited the causative removal of WEfair
jurors at the guilt phase but supported the continued exclusion of nulli-
fiers. The practical task of any remedy, therefore, is to identify these
two groups while minimizing process effects. 49 As suggested by the trial
court, identification of the critical groups could be achieved as follows:
[I]f the court clearly explains to the jurors the alleged facts un-
derlying the capital charge, and points out that the jury chosen will be
called upon only to determine the guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant-and not the penalty-and then inquires of the panel if there be
any reason why any of them could not fairly and impartially try the
issue of the defendant's guilt in accordance with the evidence
presented at the trial and the court's instructions as to the law, and
none of the jurors respond, then, the Court suggests, further inquiries
about the jurors' attitudes towards the death penalty would be inap-
propriate. . . . Of course, if a juror indicates that there might be
some reason that he or she could not fairly and impartially try the
issue of the defendant's guilt, then that juror could be isolated from
the other jurors and further inquiry made as to his or her reasons. If
scruples against the death penalty were suggested as the reason, then
further "death-qualification" questioning could be permitted and the
juror excused for cause if it is established that he or she is in fact a
nullifier.60
The ability to identify nullifiers and WEfair jurors by this proce-
dure contributes to a successful resolution of the guilt phase problem
because it makes possible remedies accommodating both the state's in-
terest (in removing nullifiers) and the defendant's interest (in retaining
WEfair jurors). The successful resolution is ultimately related to the in-
dependence of the guilt phase jury from a sentencing phase jury as the
independence eliminates the necessity to determine Witherspoon-ex-
cludables prior to the sentencing phase. As such, the procedure is
cated guilt-penalty proceeding, the justification for excluding the WEfair juror was removed. Nev-
ertheless, the traditional practice was retained.
48. Accordingly, the inclusion of nullifiers is a non-issue. Despite this status, the question
repeatedly re-emerges as if it were an issue. One reason, perhaps, is the continued reliance on
analyses from prior cases in which nullification was an issue.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 51-58.
50. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1310 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
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suited to each of the three alternative remedies because all three use
some form of a bifurcated scheme in which a juror's views on fairness,
not sentencing, define the necessary attributes for determination of
guilt. It is not suited to the single-jury system in which acceptable pen-
alty views are a prerequisite for the seating of jurors at both phases of
a trial. Beyond their common distinction from the single-jury system,
the three remedies are indistinguishable from one another at the guilt
phase and are equally successful in their treatment of the guilt phase
problem. This result is not surprising because each remedy was primar-
ily designed to achieve this very objective.
V. THE PROCESS PROBLEM
The central issue concerning death-qualified juries revolves around
the effects of death-qualification on a jury's composition and conviction
performance. In addition, and independently of these effects, there is
evidence that the very process of death-qualification produces signifi-
cant consequences on juror performance. The primary consequence is
that the death-qualification process increases the probability that the
defendant will be found guilty.
Process consequences are vividly illustrated in a study 51 in which
one-half of a group of Witherspoon-qualified jurors52 viewed a two-
hour videotape, which portrayed a voir dire examination of prospective
jurors, with thirty minutes of the tape devoted to death-qualification.
The remaining jurors viewed the identical videotape except that the
death-qualification segment was eliminated. Then, prior to hearing any
evidence, the subject-jurors responded to a questionnaire in which they
evaluated their belief in the defendant's guilt, the chance that he would
be convicted, and their perceptions of the beliefs and attitudes of the
attorneys and the judge. A comparison of the responses between the
two groups revealed several significant differences. First, the group
which had simply been exposed to the death-qualification process was
more likely to convict the defendant prior to hearing any evidence than
was the group which had not witnessed death-qualification. In addition,
subjects who were exposed to the death-qualifying voir dire were signif-
icantly more likely to believe that (a) the defendant would be convicted
and sentenced to death, (b) the judge, prosecutor and even the defense
attorney shared the belief that the defendant was guilty and would be
51. Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualifica-
tion Process, 8 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 121 (1984).
52. Note that Haney's subjects did not include WEfair jurors, as all were death-qualified.
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sentenced to death, (c) the law disapproves of persons who oppose the
death penalty, and (d) the defendant deserves the death penalty. In
Grigsby, Judge Eisele noted:
[so, independently of the compositional effects of voir dire, and in
addition thereto, the process itself increases the likelihood that the
jury which ultimately sits will be more likely to convict than the same
jury absent its exposure to that process. The process itself predisposes
the "surviving" jurors to convict.5
3
Haney54 has identified several mechanisms which contribute to
these unintended process consequences. For example, one limited
source of process effects is associated with group voir dire. Extended
discussions of penalty may imply that the defendant is guilty, and wit-
nessing such debate may desensitize the observing juror to the death
penalty. Such process effects were considered in Hovey when the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court concluded that voir dire for death-qualification
tends to create a biased, conviction-prone jury. 5 In order to minimize
such "prejudicial effects,"" the court held that individualized, seques-
tered voir dire should be required. Unfortunately, while sequestration
may eliminate some of the prejudicial effects associated with group voir
dire, it may also introduce its own unique biasing effects. This possibil-
ity, and the process problem generally, have been extensively consid-
ered by Haney.5 7 His analysis of process effects leaves most observers
generally pessimistic that the effects can be neutralized as long as
"[liegally mandated procedures compel attorneys ... to engage in
lengthy discussions about death penalty attitudes with prospective ju-
rors .... "8 Nevertheless, since the various trial structures would re-
quire death-qualification at different stages, it may be useful to distin-
guish between process effects introduced at the guilt phase versus
effects introduced at the penalty phase.
The principal, adverse process effect at the guilt phase, of course,
is the increased probability of a conviction not based upon the evidence.
The necessity to qualify jurors for possible sentencing purposes requires
a focus on penalty which generates extra-evidentiary process effects
53. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1304 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
54. Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAw
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 133 (1984).
55. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1303, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
56. Id.
57. See Haney, supra notes 51, 54.
58. Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 512, 521 (1980).
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even before any proper evidence relating to guilt or innocence is intro-
duced. Put simply, process effects are the product of a single-jury sys-
tem in which sentencing views are filtered for guilt phase eligibility.
The independent remedies manage to delay process effects until the
sentencing phase. At the guilt phase, the remedies avoid process effects
because none requires the exploration of sentencing views to determine
eligibility at the guilt phase.
The "process problem," like the "guilt phase problem," seems
most effectively resolved by the independent remedies. However, even a
single-jury system could take measures which would minimize, and
perhaps avoid, process effects at the guilt phase. Consider, for example,
the information required by the single-jury system which death-qualifi-
cation is designed to provide: the identification of jurors who would not
consider the death-penalty (or life imprisonment) under any circum-
stance. One creative alternative to death-qualification would be to de-
velop the necessary penalty information in a relatively process-free en-
vironment. One potential tool is provided by the initial juror
questionnaire used to define a juror's qualifications to serve on the
panel. A question might be included which essentially asks, "Are there
any legally prescribed punishments for criminal offenses, such as the
death penalty or life-imprisonment, which you could not fully and
fairly consider under any circumstance?" The response to this type of
question should serve to identify WE jurors and should also minimize
process effects. An incidental virtue of the modified procedure should
be a substantial savings in cost.
VI. THE SENTENCING PHASE PROBLEM
Any sentencing phase jury is required to include only those jurors
who would consider the full range of penalties prescribed by law. Until
Grigsby, the present single-jury system was not confronted with a sen-
tencing problem because all jurors unalterably opposed to the death-
penalty had already been excluded prior to the guilt phase. If WEfair
jurors were included at the guilt phase, then a single-jury system would
encounter a sentencing phase problem under circumstances in which
the composition of the guilt phase jury included one or more WEfair
jurors and that jury found the defendant guilty. Under such a circum-
stance, the WEfair jurors could not serve at the sentencing phase be-
cause their tolerance of only one penalty would subvert the state's in-
terest. This essentially restates the dilemma and suggests that some
kind of restructuring of the single-jury system is necessary if WEfair
jurors are to be represented.
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When the judge or replacement juries are used for sentencing pur-
poses, they are not presented with the "sentencing problem" since the
prior guilt phase jury, along with any WEfair jurors, would have been
dismissed prior to sentencing. The replacement remedy will occasion-
ally be presented with the problem but the replacement of the WEfair
juror is precisely the problem for which the replacement remedy was
tailored.
Another problem to be considered at the sentencing phase con-
cerns process effects. Recall that the independent remedies, and even
the single-jury system when modified by the questionnaire procedure,
are able to control process effects at the guilt phase. For the indepen-
dent remedies, however, process effects are simply delayed until the
sentencing phase when a juror's penalty view is relevant.
The separate jury and replacement jury remedies should be sub-
ject to similar process effects at the sentencing phase since both would
require that all jurors be death-qualified. To the extent that the guilt
phase itself generated process-like effects, the separate jury would not
be as vulnerable as the replacement jury. In the case of both of these
juries, however, it would again seem possible that the initial juror qual-
ification questionnaire could be used to identify the Witherspoon-ex-
cludables ineligible for the sentencing phase. The acquisition of the
critical information in such an unobtrusive manner minimally provides
temporal detachment and probably eliminates most of the adverse
process effects that can reasonably be eliminated.
In addition to minimizing process effects, the questionnaire could
be utilized advantageously for other purposes. For example, while the
replacement jury was tailored for the replacement of WEfair jurors, the
discussion of remedies noted" that the procedure could be improved if
the exact number of needed alternates could be known before any pen-
alty phase replacement became necessary. Earlier, we saw how the
questionnaire might be used to identify Witherspoon-excludables by
asking whether there were any "legally prescribed punishments for
criminal offenses, such as the death penalty or life imprisonment, which
you could not fairly and fully consider under any circumstance?" With
a slight modification, the questionnaire could also be adapted to iden-
tify WEfair jurors. For example, a question might be developed along
the lines of whether or not a prospective juror's views on penalty would
interfere with his or her determination of guilt (e.g., "are there any
legally prescribed penalties for criminal offenses which you oppose,
59. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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such as the death penalty or life imprisonment, that could conceivably
interfere with your fair and impartial determination of a defendant's
guilt of innocence?"). An affirmative response to such a question would
define potential WEfair jurors. By consulting the information available
from the questionnaire, a relatively precise estimate of the necessary
number of alternates could be derived even prior to the guilt phase of a
trial.
It might be expected that the judge would be associated with mini-
mal process effects in the absence of any necessary death-qualification.
On the other hand, a case could be made that the judge's trial experi-
ence may be equivalent to death-qualification over and over again. Ju-
dicial experience certainly would seem to provide a unique opportunity
to develop a belief that most defendants are guilty and, perhaps, that
severe penalties are appropriate. It is at least interesting to speculate
concerning the extent to which reported disparities between judges and
juries reflect process effects associated with judicial experience.
VII. THE STRUCTURE PROBLEM
A central question concerning the various remedies is whether they
introduce other effects which might defeat the state's interest in a sin-
gle-jury system. And if so, does the preservation of the state's interest
in a single-jury system take precedence over the defendant's interest in
a remedy which enhances the opportunity for a fair and impartial
trial?
The relative priority of the state's and defendant's interests will be
assessed and resolved by the Supreme Court. Here, the priority issue
will simply be sketched followed by a discussion of the state's argument
that there are functional differences between the single-jury system and
the independent jury remedies.
Simply outlined,60 the state's position on the priority issue is that
Arkansas law provides for the exclusion of WEfair jurors at the sentenc-
ing phase of a trial because of their death-penalty views. Because the
single-jury system requires the same jurors at the sentencing phase who
decided guilt, then jurors legally excluded from the sentencing phase
are necessarily excluded from the guilt phase. Further, guilt and pen-
alty are not independent decisions. Independent juries would diminish
the responsibility of jurors at both phases and therefore violate the
60. The outline is based on oral arguments made before the Court in the McCree case, supra
n.45. The state's position is presented on pp. 21-22 and also on pp. 50-53. The defense position is
presented on p.28 and p.34.
1985-86] 497
UALR LAW JOURNAL
state's fundamental interest in the single-jury system.
The defense position on the priority issue is that death-qualifica-
tion is neither justified nor required by any state interest. While con-
ceding the state's penalty interest as legitimate, the defense view holds
that determination of guilt or innocence is nonetheless primary. Since
the policy of a single-jury procedure results in a constitutional violation
at the more basic guilt phase, the defendant's constitutional interest in
a fair and impartial trial supercedes the state's interest in a penalty
procedure.
Since the burden of proof for demonstrating the inviolate status of
the single-jury system rests with the state, it will be useful to consider
the more significant effects which result from the various trial
structures.
One possible effect, considered and rejected by the trial court,61
was that independent juries would be more expensive than single juries.
A second possible effect is that independent juries might necessitate the
wholesale recall of witnesses and re-hearing of testimony. As noted ear-
lier, however, the judge, and the alternates in a replacement jury would
have heard the evidence, thereby making repetition unnecessary. This
would appear to obviate the objection to "repetitive trials" developed in
Rector.
A less apparent objection was noted in Rector, echoed by the dis-
senting opinion in the Eighth Circuit's McCree decision, and adopted
by the state. In Rector, the Arkansas Supreme Court suggested that:
A jury system that has served its purpose admirably throughout the
nation's history ought not to be twisted out of shape for the benefit of
those persons least entitled to special favors. It has always been the
law in Arkansas . . . that the same jurors who have the responsibility
for determining guilt or innocence must also shoulder the burden of
fixing the punishment. That is as it should be, for the two questions
are necessarily interwoven.62
The Rector court did not fully develop the "interwoven" nature of
the guilt and penalty determinations so it is difficult to evaluate the
contrasting effects associated with different trial structures. However,
the argument was elaborated upon somewhat in the McCree dissent
where the supporting rationale expressed was that:
Placing the moral responsibility on the same group of jurors to decide
both guilt and punishment is justified by the most significant policy
61. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1319-21 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
62. 280 Ark. at 395, 659 S.W.2d at 173.
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considerations. When one jury hears both phases of the case, the ju-
rors that comprise it cannot evade the heavy responsibility placed
upon them of whether a convicted person should receive the death
penalty ... [A] division of responsibility between the two groups,
even if only a few are replaced, would dilute accountability and disad-
vantage the accused.
63
In one sense, this argument simply suggests that the presumed in-
dependence of guilt and sentencing judgments is illusory in a single-
jury system. Empirical support for this proposition includes reports that
the evidentiary requirements of guilt necessary for conviction appear to
increase as the severity of the prescribed penalty increases." As a con-
sequence, the probability of conviction likely is related to penalty sever-
ity given a constant strength of evidence. There is less evidence availa-
ble that confidence in guilt influences penalty but it is easily
conceivable that a juror on the threshold of reasonable doubt might be
sufficiently convinced to vote for guilt but with a margin of doubt that
tempered penalty. Such results, however, may characterize independent
juries as well as single juries. The critical question, of course, involves a
comparison between single juries and independent juries. The sense of
the proposition is that the responsibility level of a juror's judgment is
diminished if the same juror is not involved in both guilt and sentenc-
ing decisions. The implication is that a juror cannot fairly and impar-
tially determine guilt on the basis of the evidence if that same juror
will not also have sentencing responsibilities. In the absence of any evi-
dence comparing the relative conviction performance between single
and independent juries, the assertion amounts to a "fireside induc-
tion"'65 which may or may not be true. In this sense, the evidence favor-
ing single juries is even more "tentative and fragmentary" than the
original evidence regarding conviction bias presented in Witherspoon.
It is possible that the concern over possible penalty influences on
guilt simply expresses anxiety over what was earlier identified as a con-
tinually resurfacing non-issue: the fear that nullifiers might be seated
at the guilt phase of a trial. In such a case, the appropriate focus would
63. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 247 (8th Cir.) cert. granted, sub nom McCree v. Lock-
hart, 546 U.S. 1088 (1985) (No. 84-1865, 1986 Term).
64. See e.g., Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty and Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 36 JOURNAL
OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1431 (1978).
65. "Fireside induction" was a phrase coined by Paul Meehi and refers to common-sense
empirical generalizations about human behavior which derive from introspection, anecdotal evi-
dence, and culturally transmitted beliefs. See P. MEEHL, LAW AND THE FIRESIDE INDUCTION:
SOME REFLECTIONS OF A CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST, LAW JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCI-
ETY (J. Tapp & F. Levine ed. 1977).
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seem to center on the ability of the voir dire questions to distinguish
between the WEfair and WEnull juror. If the distinction cannot be
achieved, the fear is real. If the distinction can be achieved, the fear
amounts to "nulliphobia" and only serves as a hidden agenda which
inhibits a satisfactory resolution to the death-qualification issue.
Finally, the argument would seem to challenge the legal norm be-
cause jury sentencing is the exception rather than the rule."' If a single
jury that decides both guilt and penalty is a priority interest because of
the fair and responsible decisions which result, it would seem to invite a
challenge from all defendants convicted by a jury but sentenced by a
judge.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The basic issue before the Court concerns the inclusion or exclu-
sion of the WEfair juror from the guilt phase of a trial. In the event of a
court decision which favored their continued exclusion, then remedies
would simply not be required. The single-jury system could be retained
in its present form. Nevertheless, the potential influence of extra-evi-
dentiary process effects could, and should, be modified. The pre-trial
identification of the Witherspoon-excludable juror would achieve the
objective of death-qualification while at the same time minimizing pro-
cess effects. While process effects are not currently a primary issue,
they may present themselves as such as this particular research frontier
is extended. It is difficult to imagine any objection to a modification
which met the state's purpose of economy and efficiency, while preserv-
ing the single-jury system. Further, the modification would contribute
to the fairness, and appearance of fairness, in capital cases.
If the Court's decision favors inclusion of the WEfair juror, then a
consideration of remedies is paramount. On the basis of the primary
issues, the defense would appear to have little preference concerning
remedies because all three equally solve the guilt phase problem. How-
ever, it may be presumed that the defense would have some objections
to the judge deciding the sentencing issue if judges actually are more
severe in penalty decisions than are juries.
The state's arguments suggest a preference for the replacement
jury. Both sentencing by the judge and by separate juries have in com-
mon the separation of "felt responsibility" to which the state has at-
tached such importance. While none of the remedies would entirely
66. In non-capital cases, jury sentencing occurs in only seven states. III AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980).
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preserve this interest, the replacement jury would most nearly achieve
the state's objective. In many cases, no replacements would be neces-
sary and the result would be the single-jury system. When replace-
ments were necessary, the number of replacements would be minimal
and the disruption of the responsibility continuum would be minimized.
In any case, if the Court perceives obstacles which prevent the in-
clusion of the WEfair juror, such obstacles would not seem to derive
from the remedies discussed here.
[Editor's Note: During the final stages of the publication of this
article, the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusion of
WEfair jurors from capital cases is not unconstitutional. Lockhart v.
McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).]

